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SOME REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND GENDER IN MODERN IRELAND  
Joanne Conaghan, University of Bristol (final pre-publication version) 
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ABSTRACT: This is the revised text of a keynote lecture delivered at the launch of Black, Lynsey and 
Dunne, Peter (eds) Law and Gender in Modern Ireland (Oxford: Hart, 2019) delivered on 13th 
September 2019 at the Department of Law, Maynooth University, Ireland. The lecture locates Black 
and Dunne’s collection within the context of recent, radical transformation in gender law and politics 
in Ireland, highlighting some of the issues which have been the focus of activism and/or reform.  The 
lecture goes on to outline some of the challenges which arise in the legislative pursuit of gender 
equality including the tension between respecting agency and choice and curbing exploitative and 
gender-disadvantaging practices. Comparisons are also made with legislative initiatives in 
neighbouring Britain.  The lecture concludes with some reflections on the interplay of sex and 
gender in law and public debate and their embedding in the constitutional creation of the modern 
Irish State.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, Ms Justice Mella Carrol, the first woman to serve on the Irish High Court, wrote the 
Foreword to a modest collection of essays entitled Gender and the Law in Ireland, edited by Alpha 
Connolly. Expressing the view that “this is a very timely book” (ix), Judge Carrol went on to call into 
question the continued relevance of some aspects of the Irish Constitution, commenting that: “It is 
rightly pointed out that the Constitution adopted in 1937 has not kept pace with social change and 
still reflects the thinking of that period” (ix). This was of course a time when divorce was 
constitutionally prohibited, abortion subject to staunch criminal sanction, homosexuality mired in a 
deep quagmire of legal and cultural repression, and, remarkably, Magdalene Laundries and other 
institutions dedicated to shaming and punishing women for departing from rigorously enforced, 
religiously-underpinned norms of sexual behaviour, still to some extent in operation. Connolly’s 
publication was timely indeed.  
All of the authors in the collection were women and all focused, almost exclusively, on the various 
ways in which women were disadvantaged by Irish law. This was in line with the scope and direction 
of feminist legal scholarship at the time. And yet here we are, just a quarter of a century later, and 
the outlook could not be more different. Many of the concerns which Connolly’s volume highlighted, 
for example, around gender inequality in the workplace or with regard to criminal justice processes, 
have since been the subject of legal and policy reform. While many of the issues which mobilized 
feminist activism at the time remain, at best, only partially resolved, their focus has shifted, or 
perhaps more accurately stretched, to encompass not just the position of women but other groups 
adversely affected by a legal, social, and cultural regime which has long demanded strict conformity 
to traditional gender roles. In this most recent, and significantly larger, collection of essays, edited by 
Lynsey Black and Peter Dunne, and entitled, not insignificantly Law and Gender in Modern Ireland, 
women’s concerns continue to warrant attention but so too do issues of sexuality and gender 
identity. Likewise, the adverse legal position of men also features, as, for example, in Tobin’s chapter 
(103) highlighting the vulnerable position of unmarried men with regard to parental rights. This 
expanded scope reflects new thinking about matters of gender and sexuality, generating a much 
wider field of legal scholarship and activism. Black and Dunne’s collection rightly recognizes that 
when a gender lens is cast upon law, it is not just women who come into view. Gender, after all, 
shapes virtually everyone’s identity and lived experience; gender is also deeply enmeshed in 




never more so than in the context of a legal scholarly tradition that has, until recently, been wilfully 
blind to its presence and effects. This is a point to which I will return.  
First, though, let’s take a closer look at the contents of this fascinating collection of essays painting a 
vivid collective picture of recent legal developments in Ireland around law and gender.  
 
RESHAPING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Notwithstanding the pioneering significance of Connolly’s earlier collection, rarely, has a publication 
been more propitiously produced than Law and Gender in Modern Ireland. Since 1993, and 
particularly in the last decade, the laws governing issues of gender and sexuality in Ireland have 
undergone nothing short of revolution, much of which is the focus of scholarly scrutiny in this new 
collection. From the constitutional endorsement of same-sex marriage in 2015 (Ryan 73) to the 
successful campaign in 2018 to repeal the Eighth Amendment of the Irish constitution, leading, in 
early 2019, to the introduction of new legislation facilitating lawful abortion (Enright 55), not to 
mention the successful divorce referendum in May 2019 paving the way for further liberalization of 
Irish divorce law, such recent radical change in Irish legal and social norms with regard to gender and 
sexuality has garnered global attention, helping to mobilize similarly progressive efforts elsewhere.1 
At the same time, we should not be dazzled by these most visible of achievements for they stand 
upon a foundation of equality-seeking reforms which, over the last 25 years, have slowly and 
steadily ratcheted up the momentum for change: let us not forget that homosexual acts were 
decriminalized in Ireland in 1993, that the constitutional prohibition on divorce was removed in 
1996, or that, from the late 1990s, anti-discrimination laws were extended to protect gays, lesbians, 
and other socially disadvantaged groups. All these developments are documented in detail by the 
19-strong team of authors featuring in Black and Dunne’s collection.   
What the editors purport to offer is ‘an honest and critical assessment of the relationship between 
law and gender in the modern Irish state’ (xxvi). And this is precisely what they deliver. This is not a 
publication which sits on the laurels of recent legislative and political success in the field of gender 
and sexuality equality. By all means commend, for example, the adoption of a humane and inclusive 
approach to gender recognition2, placing Ireland at the forefront of progressive jurisdictions in 
relation to transgender rights, but acknowledge too, as Ní Mhuirthile (191) does, that room for 
improvement remains, particularly with regard to young people and those who identify as non-
binary (199-207). Let us welcome the enactment of a raft of new laws to combat violence against 
women,3 prompted, in part, by Ireland’s ratification of the 2011 Council of Europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), 
and documented in this volume by Louise Crowley (137), but it would be naïve to think that the 
phenomenon of gender-based violence has now been fully addressed. As Leahy (3), discussing 
recent changes in sexual offences law, emphasizes, many of the difficulties with the operation of law 
in this context, derive from deeply engrained, often unconsciously held social attitudes regarding 
(hetero)sexual behaviour (17-18). It is not just the law that has to change. 
This is not to deny that huge steps forward have been made. Both in relation to gender recognition 
and measures to combat violence against women, Ireland is in many ways more progressive than its 
 
1  For example, the successful campaign in the Republic of Ireland in 2015 to legalize same-sex marriage has 
undoubtedly added to the pressure on Northern Ireland to recognize gay marriage: “Irish vote prompts same-
sex marriage call for Northern Ireland” https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-32872929 (accessed 
on 17th October 2019).     
2 Gender Recognition Act 2015.  




British neighbour.4 The gender recognition regime currently governing the whole of the UK and 
enshrined in the Gender Recognition Act 2004 has been criticized for its bureaucratic and 
pathologizing requirements.5  However, it is far from clear that a looser, self-declaratory system, 
such as that operating in Ireland, Denmark, and a growing number of other jurisdictions, will find 
legislative favour across the water.6 Indeed, a recent UK government consultation on gender 
recognition reform carried out in 2018 has prompted fierce controversy, yielding a public debate too 
often characterized by a regrettable lack of tolerance and an unnecessary polarity of views (see 
generally Hines 2019).7 Remarkably too, the UK has not yet ratified the Istanbul Convention and 
after a decade of austerity and swingeing cuts to public services, the institutional infrastructure 
supporting laws and policies with regard to domestic violence has been all but decimated. With the 
current, Brexit-induced paralysis in British political and legislative affairs, significant progress on this 
or indeed on issues of social justice generally seems unlikely in the immediate future.      
 
TENSIONS AND CHALLENGES    
Returning the focus to Ireland it must be said that not all the gender-related initiatives recently 
enacted have been met with unbridled enthusiasm, even within those circles identifying as 
progressive and/or feminist. There remains considerable contention, for example, as to whether the 
introduction of new laws8 to criminalize the purchase of sex (following the Nordic model) is the best 
way to curb the harms to which those engaged in prostitution may be exposed. In her analysis of the 
reforms, Bacik (21), while clearly a supporter of this legislative approach, nevertheless acknowledges 
the criticisms the law has attracted, particularly in terms of striking the right balance between 
respecting women’s agency and protecting them from exploitation (31-34).  Similarly, Leahy (3), 
although welcoming the introduction of a new legal definition of consent in rape law, is rightly 
critical of the legislative failure to tackle the controversial defence of honest belief in consent (which, 
it must be said, was addressed by England and Wales in the Sexual Offences Act 2003). In some 
contexts, indeed, the verdict reached on progress is equivocal at best. For example, Mulligan (117) 
laments the lack of movement in relation to surrogacy law, notwithstanding the publication of new 
legislative proposals in 2017.9  Interestingly, surrogacy is currently under the consideration of the 
Law Commission of England and Wales, which has come up with some interesting but not 
uncontroversial proposals (Law Commission 2019). As I understand it, the legal position in Ireland 
with regard to surrogacy arrangements is troublingly lacking, the ordinary rules of parenthood in 
family law applying. This places those who wish to become parents via a surrogacy arrangement in a 
vulnerable position. As Mulligan observes “the birth mother remains the mother forever” (119).  By 
 
4 Reference to Ireland’s ‘British neighbour’ is complicated by the fact that the UK comprises three jurisdictions 
for purposes of law-making, Scotland, England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. For the most part, England 
and Wales and Scotland are well aligned in relation to gender and sexuality laws although Scotland enacts its 
own legislation and at times has led the way in progressive reform. Northern Ireland is far more conservative 
continuing, for example, to prohibit abortion and same-sex marriage, both of which are legally recognized in 
the rest of the UK. Nor does the offence of controlling and coercive behaviour in intimate relationships, 
enacted in England and Wales by s 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 apply to Northern Ireland although steps 
are afoot to introduce such an offence at the time of writing.  One of the effects of progressive activism in the 
Irish Republic has been to highlight the repressiveness of gender and sexuality laws in Northern Ireland and 
their lack of alignment with both Ireland and the rest of the UK. 
5 Women and Equalities Committee (2016, 11-14). For a general overview and assessment of the British Act, 
see Dunne (2015). 
6 ‘Across the water’ is an Irish term used to denote mainland Britain.    
7 A government decision on whether to enact further reform is still awaited. 
8 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences Act) 2017, Part IV.  




contrast, the UK enacted surrogacy legislation in the 1980s10 creating a process whereby the 
commissioning parents, subject to meeting a series of tightly prescribed conditions, can apply to the 
court after the birth to have parental rights transferred. In practice this has proved to be a slow, 
cumbersome process, generating unnecessary uncertainty for all parties involved. Yet, it is a version 
of this approach which is currently being considered in Ireland. The Law Commission of England and 
Wales is now proposing something a little more radical. Having consulted widely to secure the views 
of a range of stakeholders, including women who have acted as surrogates, the Commission 
proposes a new pathway for domestic surrogacies which would allow intended parents 
automatically to assume parental rights at birth as long as certain key requirements regarding the 
surrogacy arrangement are met (Law Commission 2019, Ch 8). At the same time, the birth mother 
would be entitled to a short period after the birth to lodge an objection to the transfer of rights to 
the intended parents. The Law Commission justifies this proposal in part on the basis that it better 
respects the choice and agency of surrogates, some of whom have expressed frustration that the 
law as it stands does not automatically transfer parental rights (Law Commission 2019, Ch 7). The 
proposal has nevertheless attracted criticism from some feminist commentators. Thus, Victoria 
Smith, writing in the New Statesman, conjures up visions of Margaret Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale to 
decry the proposals, arguing that: 
The proposed changes in law have the potential to exploit economic pressures on potential 
surrogates and limit the time frame in which these women might reasonably change their 
minds. They risk re-inscribing rules that dictate who gets to have babies for themselves, and 
who doesn’t.11 
Catherine Bennett in The Guardian expresses a similar concern while also critical of the fact that the 
surrogacy proposals have come from a team of all-male Law Commissioners.12  
These issues are undoubtedly tricky, posing an apparent clash between giving weight, on the one 
hand, to choices women appear freely to make and, recognizing, on the other hand, that in some 
cases those choices may be unduly circumscribed by poverty or other pressing need, creating a real 
risk of exploitation.13 There are echoes too of the ongoing debate in Ireland about how best to 
approach the legal regulation of prostitution. The approach which has found legislative favour, as 
previously mentioned, criminalizes the purchase of sex, the object being to deter prostitution by 
cutting off demand for such services.  This contrasts with the previous approach which effectively 
criminalized the suppliers of sex, that is, sex workers. As Bacik (21) neatly puts it, the legal regulation 
of prostitution in Ireland has been legislatively reframed “from public nuisance to private 
exploitation” (21). Underlying the new law is an assumption that prostitution – the selling of sexual 
services – is inherently exploitative and deeply harmful, especially to women. This is because it 
reinscribes gender hierarchies, thereby contributing to greater gender inequality (Coy 2012; Bacik, 
32-34). As activist, Mia de Faoite, writing in The Irish Times, puts it:   
The legislation has gender equality as its founding principle; recognising that buying women 
and girls to perform sex acts is a form of exploitation and formally recognising that sexual 
consent cannot be purchased because a power imbalance is immediately introduced.14 
 
10 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. 
11 Victoria Smith (“Glosswitch”), “The proposed changes to UK’s surrogacy laws risk creating patriarchy 2.0” 
(New Statesman 10 June 2019).  
12 Catherine Bennett, “Who better than men to rule on the delicate subject of surrogacy?” The Guardian 9 June 
2019.  
13 To avoid the risk of commercial exploitation of poor women’s bodies, the Law Commission recommend the 
continued prohibition of commercial surrogacies (Law Comm 2019, Ch 15). 




In opposition to this stance, however, is a view which approaches the regulation of prostitution from 
the standpoint of those who engage in the trade, that is, sex workers themselves. It may seem 
strange to some to regard the selling of sexual services as a form of work but that is clearly how it is 
experienced by many women (Cruz 2019). Again, we confront here a protective legal stance on the 
one hand with an approach which gives weight to women’s choices on the other. How do devise a 
law which protects the vulnerable from exploitation without erasing their agency? This tension 
between legal protection and individual agency is a recurring theme of gender-focused legislation, 
with strong arguments invoked by both sides. Yet setting up the debate in this way, as an abstract 
conflict of opposing principles, one of which must necessarily trump the other, may not be the best 
way to view matters. An approach which looks carefully at the application of the proposed rule or 
policy in a specific context is surely preferable. This is not to eschew principles entirely but rather to 
trouble the way in which they can frame and contain debate. Sex workers are engaged in an 
occupation which comes with risks and some are at more risk than others. We are right to take those 
risks seriously and to consider the implications for gender inequality of prostitution as a social and 
commercial practice. At the same time, we should not, without very good reason, deny agency to a 
whole class or group of actors. Looking at the regulation of sex work from the perspective of the 
objects it seeks to achieve demands an evidence-led, materially embedded approach. Interestingly, a 
recent report on similar legislation introduced in Northern Ireland in 2015,15 has found that the 
effect of introducing new laws criminalizing the purchase of sex has been to produce an upswing in 
demand and supply rather than a downturn (Ellison et al 2019). The authors of the report rather 
damningly conclude that the introduction of the legislation “has had minimal to no effect on the 
demand for prostitution, the number of active sex workers in the jurisdiction and on levels of human 
trafficking for sexual exploitation”’ (ibid 167). They go on to acknowledge the fact that their findings 
diverge from studies carried out on the effect of similar legislation in the Nordic regions but account 
for this divergence in terms of differences in service delivery: the success of the Nordic model rests 
on the prevalence of on-street selling whereas in Northern Ireland, most sex workers operate online 
and indoors (ibid 166). In other words, whether what works in Sweden will also work in 
Northern/Ireland is, as much as anything, an empirical question, and certainly not one that can be 
confidently answered in the abstract.      
There is another reason for taking a more pragmatic, or as I prefer it, provisional, approach to legal 
dilemmas such as those frequently encountered in relation to gender. Circumstances change. 
Societies do not stand still. We know of course that law often struggles to keep up with the pace of 
social change but, equally, law can be an instrument of change, can also actually lead the way, not 
least because legal proposals, particularly those with constitutional dimensions, compel a 
conversation which people might otherwise choose to avoid. Enright’s (55) insightful analysis of the 
process by which a long campaign of anti-eighth amendment activism slowly shaped the public 
conversation in relation to abortion law reform in Ireland exemplifies this phenomenon - the 
opportunities and challenges it can generate. And in their concluding chapter, the editors, Black and 
Dunne (318) reflect more broadly on the interrelationship between legal activism and socio-cultural 
change. They highlight in particular how legal activism around gender and sexuality issues has 
“crystallise[d] at moments of cultural and generational shift, not least the receding moral authority 
of the Catholic Church from the mid-1990s onwards” (321). This brings into view a much wider and 
even weightier aspect of progressive legal activism in modern Ireland, its ongoing contribution to 
reshaping a new national identity in which religion is rightfully relegated to the sidelines.  
 
GENDER AS A CATEGORY OF ANALYSIS 
 




There can be little doubt that social attitudes in Ireland in relation to gender and sexuality have 
changed quite substantially. Between the Connolly publication, in which law and gender issues were 
conceived almost entirely in terms of women’s inequality, to the publication of the Black and Dunne 
collection in 2019, we have begun to think about gender very differently. In 1993, gender was still 
being primarily deployed in legal scholarship and policymaking to signify women’s issues. This was a 
period when, time and time again, the critical scrutiny of feminist legal scholars and activists brought 
into sharp and often painful relief the continuing legacy of a powerfully patriarchal past. This process 
is still ongoing in Ireland as the nation slowly come to terms with the appalling extent to which the 
State failed to protect the rights, to acknowledge the very personhood of vulnerable women and 
their children. Gallen’s (263) account of the mistreatment of women in Magdalene Laundries and 
Mother and Baby Homes, not to mention the continued use in childbirth of the barbaric medical 
practice of symphysiotomy, makes difficult but necessary reading. We can be under no illusions 
about the extent to which Irish women have suffered as a consequence of State-sanctioned, often 
religiously fomented misogyny.   
Yet, there is much more to the interface of gender and law than discrimination against or 
mistreatment of women. What we see in the expansion of feminist legal engagement to encompass 
the rights of lesbian, bisexual gay, transgender, and intersex people is the deployment of “gender” 
not simply as a signifier of identity but more importantly as an analytical tool with which to 
interrogate law and legal outcomes. This foregrounding of gender constitutes the methodological 
core of feminist legal scholarship (Conaghan 2017). It is a conscious reversal of what is often 
assumed to be a standard operating presumption in legal scholarship, namely that gender is not 
analytically relevant, except in so far as it revealed to be so contingently by the application of 
conventional legal analytical techniques. By looking at law through a gendered lens, feminist and 
queer scholarship is not committing itself to a position that gender is always and necessarily a 
category of legal significance; rather it proceeds on the hypothesis that it likely to be to see what 
insights this may produce. Consider, for example, Donnelly’s (173) analysis of the Irish financial crisis. 
We would not immediately see this as a gender issue. And yet when Donnelly casts her gaze, a 
number of interesting insights about the gendered impacts of the financial crisis come into view, 
particularly with regard to the legal and practical difficulties faced by one spouse or partner as a 
consequence of the indebtedness of another, what Donnelly and other scholars in her field refer to 
as “sexually transmitted debt” (174-176).  
This, by the way, is another feature of an analytical approach to law which takes gender as its point 
of entry: it leads to the generation of new concepts. “Sexually transmitted debt” captures a concern 
about financial regulation which might otherwise go overlooked, forcing us to view an issue from a 
different angle. “Sex work” is another feminist engendered concept, challenging us to confront the 
fact that many sellers of sexual services experience the transaction as a form of work and view 
themselves as workers, entitled to rights or recognition as such. The point about these concepts is 
not that they are better than more conventional frames but rather that they force us to think 
outside the parameters of language and discourse already set. For this reason, they are likely to 
produce insights capable of enriching our understanding of and ability to respond to the kinds of 
legal and policy dilemmas I have been highlighting here.  
Deploying gender as analytical tool also allows us to see clearly the conceptual and ideological links 
between the unequal position of women in law and society and the disadvantages which have 
traditionally accompanied gay, lesbian, and transgender status. In all these contexts, gender is the 
unifying thread, defining women’s social role in relation to men, imposing upon men and women 
strict norms of gender-conformity, and denying the possibility and/or propriety of gender norm-
transgression or eschewal. We might view the social structures, processes, and relations which 
gendered norms and divisions generate as making up a “gender regime”. Anthropologically speaking, 
gender-based norms and divisions are present in virtually all societies. Gender operates as a form of 




apprehended, how gendered subjects are formed, gender relations established and regulated, will 
vary from society to society, and even within a single society at different points in time.  In other 
words, the nature of the gendered order or regime is dependent on what notion of gender is in play 
and how it is mobilized. Think about the deployment of gender in grammar as a way of classifying 
linguistic phenomena into separate groups. This reflects the etymological origins of the word, which 
derives from the old French gendre and the Latin stem, genus, meaning “kind or sort”. Of course, the 
primary understanding of gender today is as an extension of, supplement to, and sometimes 
synonym for “sex”, but reflecting on gender’s etymological origins draws attention to how the term 
functions, that is, as a way of classifying phenomena in accordance with some socially agreed system 
of distinctions. And what is socially agreed may undergo change.  
 
SEX AND GENDER CONTESTATIONS 
Some people contend that “gender” should be deployed in contradistinction to “sex”, so that sex is 
used to designate biologically based differences between men and women while gender signifies 
socially contrived, eminently contestable distinctions (See, for example, Green 2011, 4). Even here 
though the lines begin to blur because how we perceive biology is also inevitably socially and 
culturally imbued. Until the eighteenth century, for example, the scientific apprehension of women’s 
bodies was to view them not as different from men’s but rather as poor, somewhat defective 
replicas, what Laqueur refers to as a “one-sex model” (1990 25). This perception of biological 
imperfection helped to justify women’s inferior social status, producing a social order in which sex 
was conceived hierarchically and difference predicated on gendered social roles.  As Laqueur puts it: 
“To be a man or a woman was to hold a social rank, a place in society, to assume a cultural role, not 
to be organically one or the other of two incommensurable sexes” (1990, 8). Laqueur goes on to 
trace the emergence of a new understanding of sex during the course of the eighteenth century, 
what he calls the “two-sex model”, corresponding with the dominant cultural understanding of sex 
today (ibid).  This change in perception partly came about as a result of advances in scientific 
knowledge, bringing a new understanding of human anatomy to bear on apprehensions of 
corporeality. Within this context, women’s bodies were increasingly seen in opposition to men’s, as 
different rather than defective, a view which resonated with emerging ideas of sexual equality while 
simultaneously supporting the view that sexes should occupy distinct social spheres.  
The point I am making here is that over time and space our conceptions of gender and sex have 
changed and that neither is left untouched by social and cultural norms. Fast forward to the twenty-
first century where an increased understanding of intersex, of how hormones contribute to 
corporeal formation and development, of the mutability of biological features and processes 
previously understood as fixed and immutable all call into question perceptions of sex as natural and 
unalterable. The possibilities opened up by new frontiers of knowledge about sex and gender cannot 
be unthought. Gender and sex continue to be at the forefront of our ideas about self; they continue 
to shape and mediate relations of power, but how we apprehend and mobilize gender and sex has 
become increasingly contested in public debate. Take the question, what is a woman?  Historically, 
what constitutes a woman has been variously anchored in biology (the two-sex model) and social 
convention (the one-sex model). While at different times, different conceptions have dominated, sex 
and gender have continuously colluded to produce ideas of femininity and masculinity: what 
constitutes a woman then has always been a matter of contestation to some degree.  
 
GENDER CONSTITUTIONALIZED 
The 1937 Irish Constitution is the perfect exemplar of this entanglement of sex and gender, 




constitutional gendering is highlighted in Brady’s (211) fascinating analysis of the incorporation of 
sex/gender categories directly into the constitutional text so that the gender regime of the time 
became perpetually enshrined in the newly created postcolonial Irish state: 
The State recognizes that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support 
which the common good cannot be achieved (Art 41.2.1). 
There is something quite remarkable about this provision, notwithstanding its overt sexism, in that it 
formally recognizes the contribution of women’s reproductive labour to the public good. This curious 
linkage of domestic (private) and political (public) arrangements lays bare the significant role played 
by a highly traditional gendered division of labour in constituting the modern Irish State.  The 
provision which follows is of equal interest:  
The State shall therefore endeavor to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic 
necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home (Art 41.2.2).  
While women are constitutionally charged with carrying out their domestic duties, they are 
encouraged here to expect economic support for their efforts, from which we can surely infer 
constitutional acknowledgment that women’s work in the home has economic value. Again, this 
provision stands in stark contrast to conventional economic assumptions predicated on the non-
productive character of housework. Unfortunately for Irish women, neither the Constitution nor the 
Irish State has introduced formal legal mechanisms to ensure that women’s legitimate expectation 
of support is realized. One debate currently going on in Ireland and considered, inter alia by Brady, is 
whether to recraft this constitutional provision (and/or its interpretation) in gender-neutral terms, 
thereby preserving the constitutional endorsement of unpaid care work while disassociating it from 
gendered social roles. This effort to “reconstitute” care work has some merit but is not without risks. 
Removing gender from the letter of the Constitution may simply obscure a gendered division of 
labour rather than disrupt it.  My preference therefore is to jettison Article 41.2 entirely, to 
reimagine an Irish State that is no longer predicated upon a constitutionally enshrined, 
heteronormatively grounded social order.  
It is fitting perhaps that, as we approach the centenary of the birth of Modern Ireland, we feel 
confident enough to cast a critical eye over the circumstances of our becoming as a self-governing, 
independent nation state. Within this broader context, and given the foundational role accorded to 
gender in the making of the Irish State, it is right that we remake gender and Irishness to reflect and 
promote the values, dreams, and aspirations of the modern Irish citizenry. As someone who was 
born in the British governed North of Ireland, and has grown up with a somewhat uncertain sense of 
my precise relation with the Irish Republic, and indeed Irishness, I am particularly interested in this 
ongoing process of reshaping the character and contours of Ireland in the twenty-first century. 
Within that context, I am grateful to the editors and contributors of Law and Gender in Modern 
Ireland for offering such an expansive, rigorous, yet wonderfully accessible analysis of gender in Irish 
law at this pertinent moment in Irish history. There is a lot to be learned from Irish legal scholarship 
and activism around gender, particularly given the common law heritage it shares with so many 
other jurisdictions. The recent Irish experience offers a valuable testing ground for tracking the 
processes by which activist-led law reform campaigns become translated into formal legislative 
enactments and concrete lived rights. For this reason, as well as many others, I commend this book 
to you and congratulate the authors and editors on a truly fine scholarly achievement. Thank you for 
inviting me here today and for your attention.             
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